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INCORRIGIBLE  STUDENTS:
A  CRIMINAL  OXYMORON?
Shannon Lewry*
INTRODUCTION
Compulsory education laws and juvenile life sentences without the possi-
bility of parole are fundamentally incompatible.  Behind each state’s compul-
sory education law, which often demands school attendance until the age of
seventeen or eighteen, is an assumption that all children live in a state of
dependency upon educators for their cognitive and social development, until
they reach adulthood.  Behind states’ authorization of juvenile-life-without-
parole sentences, in contrast, is an assumption that children under the age of
eighteen are susceptible to “irreparable corruption” and “incorrigibility,”
such that no rehabilitative measure, educational program, or support system
could possibly restore their potential to reenter society as free, productive
members of a democracy.  If youth education is compulsory, even for youths
in prison, and a primary purpose of education is to prepare youths to be
successful, active members of their communities, compulsory education laws
and juvenile-life-without-parole sentences cannot rationally coexist.  This
Note suggests that youth advocates might be wise to capitalize on the conflict
between education law and criminal law as they urge state legislatures to
eliminate juvenile-life-without-parole sentences from state criminal codes.
The Note proceeds in two Parts.  The remainder of the Introduction
presents a closed door: the Supreme Court’s hesitancy, to date, to find juve-
nile-life-without-parole sentences unconstitutional under the Eighth Amend-
ment.  After exploring the contours of the closed Door, the Introduction
turns to an open window: education law.  This, I argue, may be wielded to
attack the lawfulness of juvenile-life-without-parole sentences on wholly non-
constitutional grounds.  The Introduction concludes with remarks regarding
this Note’s relevance and timeliness.  Part I tracks the Note’s central argu-
ment, premise by premise, that state compulsory education laws and juvenile-
life-without-parole sentences are wholly incompatible.  Part II anticipates
objections to the argument, responds, and attempts to fill any lingering logi-
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cal gaps.  I then conclude by suggesting contexts beyond the scope of this
Note in which the relationship between compulsory education laws and pris-
oners’ rights might prove useful.
A. The Door
As of late 2017, it is not unconstitutional to impose a life sentence with-
out the possibility of parole on a juvenile criminal defendant.1  Although the
Constitution requires states to reserve this sentence as punishment for youths
whose crimes reflect “irreparable corruption”2—categorically excluding all
nonhomicide defendants3—judges and juries in most states still have author-
ity to impose life-without-parole sentences on juvenile homicide defendants
at their discretion.4
The Court’s recent discussions of juvenile-life-without-parole (“JLWOP”)
sentences has revealed, or at least reiterated, rich judicial commentary on
juvenile culpability, maturity, and development.  Justice Kennedy’s admon-
ishment of mandatory JLWOP sentences in Miller v. Alabama, for example,
turned on the “distinctive attributes of youth . . .[:] immaturity, recklessness,
and impetuosity,” among others.5 Miller highlighted the plurality’s intuitive
notion that “incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.”6  While this sentiment
alone could serve as grounds for holding that JLWOP sentences are entirely
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment, not just for nonhomicide
defendants, the broader issue of JLWOP’s constitutionality has not yet been
squarely presented to the Court.  At the very least, it is evident that the Court
finds in juvenile defendants “greater prospects for reform” than in their
adult counterparts.7
The body of juvenile punishment cases arising under the Eighth Amend-
ment, which “turn[ ] on the characteristics of the offender,” has produced a
set of “categorical rules . . . for defendants who committed their crimes
before the age of 18.”8  The Court uses a two-part test to determine whether
1 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (holding narrowly that “a judge
or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances” before sentencing
juvenile defendants to life without parole).
2 Id. at 2469 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
3 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
4 JOSH ROVNER, SENTENCING PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AN OVERVIEW 3
(2017), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/
(“Thirty states still allow life without parole as a sentencing option for juveniles.”).
5 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993)
(“[S]ignature qualities of youth are transient . . . the impetuousness and recklessness that
may dominate in younger years can subside.”).
6 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 73) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
7 See id. at 2464; see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (reaf-
firming that “children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change”); Roper,
543 U.S. at 570 (“[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.
The personality traits . . . are more transitory, less fixed.”).
8 Graham, 560 U.S. at 61.
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it should establish a new categorical rule governing criminal sentencing prac-
tices under the Eighth Amendment.  First, the Court asks “whether there is a
national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue”; this is an objec-
tive inquiry.9  Second, the Court asks whether, guided by “its own indepen-
dent judgment” and by the principles of stare decisis, the punishment in
issue seems cruel and unusual.10  Within this framework, the Court has cate-
gorically prohibited mandatory JLWOP sentences (Miller v. Alabama),11
JLWOP sentences for youths who commit crimes other than homicide (Gra-
ham v. Florida),12 and juvenile capital punishment (Roper v. Simmons).13
It is quite possible, considering the trend of pushback against harsh
criminal sentences for juveniles reflected in these cases, that the Court would
adopt a categorical rule against all JLWOP sentences if squarely presented
with this issue.  Thirty states currently authorize JLWOP sentences.14  Yet,
“just three—Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Louisiana—account for about two-
thirds of JLWOP sentences,”15 and California, “home to one of the largest
populations of JLWOP defendants,” recently responded to Miller with sweep-
ing reforms to its juvenile sentencing laws.16  Moreover, abundant research
suggests that juveniles are simply unfit to receive permanent prison
sentences.17  Given the overwhelming evidence that children and adolescents
do not fully mature or formulate their “personalities” until at least the age of
eighteen, there is a consensus, at least among members of the American Psy-
chological and American Psychiatric Associations, that “predictions cannot
be made with any accuracy” as to juvenile defendants’ likelihood of
recidivism.18
Perhaps this evidence would be sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the
Court’s Eighth Amendment categorical rule test (“national consensus against
the sentencing practice at issue”).19  Perhaps the justices could also reach a
consensus that JLWOP is subjectively cruel, drawing on language from Gra-
ham, Miller, and Montgomery, to satisfy the second prong of the test.  State
9 Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 563).
10 Id.
11 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.
12 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 61.
13 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 572–73.
14 See ROVNER, supra note 4, at 3.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 5; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i) (West 2017) (granting
juveniles sentenced to life without parole the right to “submit to the sentencing court a
petition for recall and resentencing” after serving fifteen years, with limited exceptions).
17 See ELIZABETH SCOTT ET AL., MODELS FOR CHANGE: SYSTEMS REFORM IN JUVENILE JUS-
TICE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF JUVENILE SENTENCING 6–9 (2015).
18 Brief for Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22,
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 174239, at *22.
19 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
572 (2005)).
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courts have recognized the Court’s momentum in this direction; death to
JLWOP under the Eighth Amendment might well be on the horizon.20
Nonetheless, until a proper JLWOP case reaches the Supreme Court,
some juvenile homicide defendants will continue to face life imprisonment
for their crimes without the possibility of parole.21  And even if a proper case
does make its way to Washington, there is no guarantee that the Court will
adopt a categorical rule against JLWOP.  The two-part Eighth Amendment
categorical-rule test is a formidable obstacle to abrogating the states’ right to
sentence criminals as they see fit, made even more formidable by the fact that
four justices dissented from Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion in Miller.22  A
prosecuting state attorney could persuasively argue, if the proper JLWOP
case arose, that it is the province of the states—the “principal guardians of
community safety”—to determine the lawfulness of JLWOP, not the Court.23
The Chief Justice argued as much in his dissent in Miller, perhaps in a final
effort to slow the Court’s Eighth Amendment rulemaking momentum toward
eliminating JLWOP altogether.24
It is also entirely possible that within the next decade, legislatures in
states currently issuing JLWOP sentences will choose to independently elimi-
nate these sentences from their criminal codes.25  Nationwide, there is a
20 See, e.g., State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1214 (Conn. 2015) (“[Miller] suggests . . . in
effect, a presumption against imposing a life sentence without parole on a juvenile
offender . . . . This presumption logically would extend to discretionary schemes that
authorize such a sentence.”).
21 It is worth noting that this category of “homicide crimes” includes felony murder in
the JLWOP context; the defendant in Miller v. Alabama was himself charged with felony
murder.  For a discussion of juvenile felony murder rates in tandem with Justice Kennedy’s
observation that “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and
outside pressures, including peer pressure,” Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, see Sterling Root, Juve-
nile Culpability and the Felony Murder Rule: Applying the Enmund Standard to Juveniles
Facing Felony Murder Charges 62–64 (2016) (unpublished A.B. thesis, Trinity College),
http://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses/562/.
22 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito dissented, and Justice Scalia
joined each of their opinions. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477–82 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting);
id. at 2482–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2487–90 (Alito, J., dissenting).
23 Brief for State of Michigan et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1,
Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2012 WL 605831, at *1 (arguing that states have discretion “to
determine which punishment is most appropriate to vindicate justice, deter others from
committing crime, and ensure that the perpetrator is unable to reoffend”).
24 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Unless confined, the only stop-
ping point for the Court’s analysis would be never permitting juvenile offenders to be tried
as adults . . . . There is no clear reason that principle would not bar all mandatory
sentences for juveniles.”).
25 Local courts could also find JLWOP unconstitutional at the state level, but only two
state supreme courts (Iowa and Massachusetts) have issued such holdings. See Grant Rod-
gers, Court: Juvenile Killers Can’t Get Life Without Parole, DES MOINES REG. (May 27, 2016),
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/crime-and-courts/2016/05/27/court-
juvenile-killers-cant-get-life-without-parole/85025960/.
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strong push among activists to eliminate JLWOP;26 even states such as Cali-
fornia and Louisiana have taken bold legislative steps that reflect this trend.27
If state legislatures fail to act, perhaps sympathetic state governors could
begin exercising executive clemency power to reduce JLWOP sentences at
the urging of children’s rights advocates across the country.28
The foregoing review of JLWOP’s legal status should demonstrate that,
in the thirty states that still authorize it, JLWOP’s fate is at best doomed and
at worst uncertain.29  It is worth asking: are these good odds good enough for
juvenile defendants on trial for homicide?  Arguably, no.30
B. The Window
Fortunately, JLWOP’s fate might not rest entirely on the Court’s adop-
tion of a new categorical Eighth Amendment rule. Education law could serve
as a window—a loophole, of sorts—through which state legislatures or courts
might justify eliminating JLWOP from state criminal codes while sidestep-
ping Eighth Amendment categorical rule requirements altogether.  The
argument that compulsory education laws and JLWOP sentences are incom-
patible would proceed as follows.
The following premises are well established31: (A) states require chil-
dren to attend school until they reach a certain statutory age; (B) among
26 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS INST., COLUMBIA LAW SCH., CHALLENGING JUVENILE LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE: HOW HAS HUMAN RIGHTS MADE A DIFFERENCE? (2014); Katherine Ara-
gon, A Legal View: Why Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentences Are a Mistake, RECLAIMING
FUTURES (Jan. 18, 2012), http://reclaimingfutures.org/legal-view-why-juvenile-life-without-
parole-sentences-are-mistake; End Juvenile Life Without Parole, ACLU (2017), https://
www.aclu.org/end-juvenile-life-without-parole.
27 See Kelcy Whitaker, Legislative Update: A Look at Juvenile Life Without Parole Post-Miller,
34 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 139, 140 (2013); AP, Bill to Parole Juvenile Lifers Halted in Final
Moments, WBBJ-TV (June 7, 2016), http://www.wbbjtv.com/2016/06/07/bill-to-parole-
juvenile-lifers-halted-in-final-moments/ (noting that the Louisiana House of Representa-
tives voted eighty-two to three to give juvenile lifers a parole option, but the Senate rejected
the proposal); supra note 16 and accompanying text.
28 See generally Anthony C. Thompson, Clemency for Our Children, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
2641 (2011).
29 See Daja Henry, Bill to Get Rid of Life Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders Moves Through
Senate, NEW ORLEANS TRIB. (June 1, 2016), http://www.theneworleanstribune.com/main/
news/bill-to-get-rid-of-life-without-parole-for-juvenile-offenders-moves-through-senate/
(“[T]here has been a general trend of loosening laws on [JLWOP] . . . . If the states keep
following this trend, it is likely that [JLWOP] sentences will follow the same fate as capital
punishment of juveniles.  Once state legislatures established a trend of abolishing capital
punishment of juveniles, the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional.”).
30 See generally Jeremiah Bourgeois, The Irrelevance of Reform: Maturation in the Depart-
ment of Corrections, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 152 (2013) (noting that, from the perspec-
tive of a former inmate sentenced to life without parole at age fourteen, reform is “slow
indeed, especially for the prisoner with a now fully-developed brain who recognizes, after
decades confined, that each passing day cannot bring him further maturity, but will bring
him closer to senility and death”).
31 See infra notes 41–108 and accompanying text.
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states’ justifications for imposing compulsory education requirements are the
fundamental goals public education is designed to achieve—preparing citi-
zens for life as productive members of their communities, and preparing
them to participate actively in a democratic society; (C) life-without-parole
sentences permanently and irreversibly deprive juvenile defendants of the
opportunity to become productive members of their communities or to par-
ticipate actively in their own democracy.  The sum of these premises suggests
that JLWOP recipients, who enter prison while under the umbrella of state
compulsory education laws, are required by law to prepare for futures of
which the state permanently deprives them.  This result is unsatisfactory.  It is
arguable, under this framework, that JLWOP sentences should not, and can-
not, logically be imposed upon school-age children.
Although JLWOP is legal in most states, juvenile defendants in Penn-
sylvania, Michigan, and Louisiana account for approximately two-thirds of
the nation’s JLWOP sentence recipients, and California is home to one of the
nation’s largest JLWOP populations.32  This Note accordingly devotes atten-
tion to the compulsory education laws, purported goals of education, and
criminal education requirements of these four states.  The exclusion of other
states from this analysis in no way suggests that the argument is inapplicable
nationwide.  On the contrary, this analysis might serve as a fungible model
for juvenile rights activists, politicians, and courts of any state that authorizes
JLWOP to apply in the course of their work.
C. Relevance: Why Bother?
As of August 2015, when Michigan and fifteen other states appeared as
amici curiae in Montgomery v. Louisiana to argue that prosecutors should not
be required to apply Miller v. Alabama retroactively, 368 prisoners sentenced
as juveniles to life without parole were incarcerated in Michigan, 482 in
Pennsylvania, and 202 in Louisiana.33  In July 2016, Wayne County (Michi-
gan) Prosecutor Kym Worthy reviewed each of the 145 unconstitutional
mandatory JLWOP sentences that had been issued in her district alone since
1963.34  Although the Court’s holding in Montgomery requires prosecutors to
reassess the constitutionality of each JLWOP sentence imposed under a
mandatory sentencing regime, Montgomery does not require those prosecu-
tors to revoke sentences that would have been deemed necessary and appro-
priate under Miller’s standards at the time of trial.35  Kym Worthy assured the
Detroit community that some JLWOP prisoners in her jurisdiction would
32 ROVNER, supra note 4, at 3, 5.
33 Brief for Michigan et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (No. 14-280), 2015 WL 5169098, at *13–15.
34 Oralandar Brand-Williams & Mike Martindale, Worthy Seeking Resentencing of Juvenile
Lifers, DET. NEWS (July 23, 2016), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-
county/2016/07/22/worthy-seeking-resentencing-juvenile-lifers/87439616/.
35 See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736–37.  “[T]he sentencing judge must consider not
only the youth’s age and its attendant circumstances, but also the youth’s family and home
environment and potential for rehabilitation.”  Whitaker, supra note 27, at 139.
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receive new term-of-years sentences under Montgomery—“[i]n many of the
cases . . . [still] more time than the minimum sentence of 25 years”—but she
also promised to “aggressively pursue life without possibility of parole in 60
other cases.”36  Thus, despite Montgomery’s mitigating effect on JLWOP sen-
tencing, many prisoners still stand to benefit from a categorical rule against
JLWOP or from other avenues of reform.
In Miller’s wake, California introduced swift and generally effective juve-
nile sentencing reforms.  Since 2013, even before the Court issued its opin-
ion in Montgomery, many recipients of unconstitutionally mandatory JLWOP
sentences in California have been granted a “meaningful chance at parole
after 15 to 25 years.”37  California’s Supreme Court also freely acknowledged
in 2014 that lower courts had incorrectly construed the state sentencing
guidelines “as creating a presumption in favor of life without parole as the
appropriate penalty” for juvenile homicide defendants.38  The court clarified
that although the judges have discretion to issue either a twenty-five-years-to-
life sentence or a life-without-parole sentence to a juvenile homicide defen-
dant, there must be no presumption in favor of the harsher penalty.39  This
clarification is helpful prospectively, but the very fact that an “off-the-books”
JLWOP presumption existed until 2014 suggests that many youths sentenced
to life without parole during this time will have difficulty seeking resentenc-
ing hearings under Montgomery if they do not qualify for recall and resentenc-
ing under the state’s recent reform bill.40  Despite the faulty presumption in
favor of JLWOP, these sentences were not technically mandatory (and thus,
not technically unconstitutional under Miller) when issued.
Despite Montgomery and Miller, the urgency of the search for an end to
JLWOP sentencing, and any retroactive effects of such reform, has not
waned.  Education law’s contribution to this effort is both timely and poten-
tially life-altering for those who remain in prison without parole despite
recent waves of judicial and legislative reform.
I. ARGUMENT
A. The Rule: Compulsory Education
In Pennsylvania, education is compulsory for all children under seven-
teen years of age.41  Pennsylvania’s JLWOP recipients, sentenced as adults to
36 Brand-Williams & Martindale, supra note 34.
37 ROVNER, supra note 4, at 3, 5.  JLWOP recipients convicted of torture or crimes
against public safety officials, law enforcement, firefighters, or government officers are cat-
egorically prohibited from seeking this relief. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(ii) (West
2017).
38 People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 249 (Cal. 2014).
39 Id. at 250.
40 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
41 See 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1326 (2017).  While all students are required to attend
school until age seventeen, all citizens under the age of twenty-one are entitled to receive
state-sponsored education until the completion of high school. See Brian B. v. Pa. Dep’t of
Educ., 230 F.3d 582, 584 (3d Cir. 2000).  Youths under the age of seventeen who have
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serve time in state facilities (as opposed to local facilities), are just as entitled
to an education that comports with Pennsylvania’s school code as other
school-aged youths.42  Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections specifically
provides that “students/inmates under 21 years of age are provided instruc-
tion by certified teaching staff.”43  Notably, this Bureau’s mission statement
reflects the same goals of education offered by many states beyond the crimi-
nal context44: “To provide educational opportunities which will enable
inmates to become responsible and productive citizens in a diverse society.”45
In Michigan, education is compulsory until a child reaches eighteen
years of age.46  Although youths in adult prisons in Michigan are not statuto-
rily exempt from the state’s compulsory education laws,47 educational oppor-
tunities for school-aged prisoners are extremely limited.  Michigan’s adult
prisons (as compared to its juvenile detention centers) are generally ill-
equipped to provide educational services that comport with the state’s public
school requirements.48  A recent estimate suggests that youths incarcerated
in adult prisons in Michigan receive “about eight hours of education a
completed the equivalent of a high school education are exempt from the compulsory
attendance requirement. See 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1326.
42 In Pennsylvania, state inmates receive a full education, while county inmates receive
limited education.  A youthful offender’s place of incarceration depends on the length of
sentence and in certain cases the discretion of the sentencing judge.  Those sentenced to
two years or less are confined in county facilities.  Those sentenced to five years or more go
to state facilities. Brian B., 230 F.3d at 585 (interpreting 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1306.2).
Pennsylvania offers four justifications—all deemed rational—for the discrepancy
between educational programming offered in state and local prisons: “1) space limitations
in county correctional institutions; 2) higher per-student cost in county correctional insti-
tutions; 3) security concerns that would arise in state correctional institutions if education
were discontinued; and 4) the greater need for education in state correctional institutions,
independent of security concerns.” Id. at 586–87.
43 JOHN E. WETZEL ET AL., PA. DEP’T OF CORR., EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS REVIEW 4,
http://www.cor.pa.gov/Inmates/Documents/Educa-
tion%20and%20Vocation%20Documents/Education%20Programs.pdf (detailing the
rights granted to inmates under the Commonwealth Secondary Diploma Program).
44 See infra notes 82–106 and accompanying text.
45 WETZEL ET AL., supra note 43.
46 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1561(1) (West 2017) (stating compulsory attend-
ance until age eighteen applies to every child “who turns age 11 on or after December 1,
2009 or . . . who was age 11 before that date and enters grade 6 in 2009 or later”).
47 See Irene Y. H. Ng et al., Comparison of Correctional Services to Youth Incarcerated in
Adult and Juvenile Facilities in Michigan, 92 PRISON J. 460, 464 (2012).
48 See generally MICHELLE WEEMHOFF & KRISTEN STALEY, MICH. COUNCIL ON CRIME &
DELINQUENCY, YOUTH BEHIND BARS 16–18 (2014) (“MDOC does not have a separate policy
directive specifically addressing youthful offenders in prison.  Other than separating all
youth under age 18 by sight and sound from adults (as required under the [Prison Rape
Elimination Act] regulations), MDOC treats youth in much the same way as adult
inmates.”).
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week.”49  Michigan’s Department of Corrections sets forth an educational
programming mission statement similar to that of Pennsylvania’s corrections
department; however, Michigan draws more attention to the benefits of edu-
cation to prisoners while incarcerated.  Michigan aims “[t]o provide educa-
tional opportunities . . . in order for [prisoners] to become contributing,
productive members of the prison community while incarcerated and con-
tributing members of their communities upon release from prison.”50
California also requires all youths under the age of eighteen to attend
school.51  Juvenile defendants who enter California’s juvenile court system
clearly fall within the scope of California’s compulsory education require-
ments.52  In terms of access to educational programming in adult prisons,
every California Department of Education and Rehabilitation institution
offers GED and high school diploma programs.53  Youths incarcerated in
adult prisons have not been excluded from the terms of California’s compul-
sory education laws.
In Louisiana, as in Michigan and California, education is compulsory
until a student reaches the age of eighteen.54  Louisiana’s Children’s Code
explicitly provides that incarcerated youth will be afforded an individualized
academic plan.55  One factor the Department of Public Safety and Correc-
tions considers while developing such a plan is the length of time the Depart-
ment expects the child to remain in detention.56  The Department must
submit the plan, as well as a report on the child’s academic progress, to the
court.57  No provision of the “Delinquency” chapter of the Children’s Code
excludes JLWOP recipients from receiving the same attention as other incar-
cerated youths.  However, the Code does indicate that the individualized aca-
demic plans are partially designed to facilitate each child’s reentry into the
“school or academic program in which the child is thereafter enrolled.”58
The dearth of literature surrounding school-aged inmates’ right and
access to education in adult prisons59 is quite shocking.  It does, however,
49 Ted Roelofs, Is Michigan’s Criminal System, One That Prosecutes Teens as Adults, Wasting
20,000 Lives and at What Expense?, MLIVE.COM (June 10, 2014), http://www.mlive.com/
politics/index.ssf/2014/06/ is_michigan_ wasting_20000_teen.html.
50 MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMMING, http://www.michigan.gov/cor
rections/0,4551,7-119-9741_12798-294493—,00.html.
51 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 2017).
52 See Juvenile Court Schools, CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Oct. 13, 2015), http://
www.cde.ca.gov/sp/eo/jc/ (“County boards of education administer and operate the juve-
nile court schools . . . . Funding is provided by the state General Fund and is included in
the annual apportionment to county offices of education.”).
53 See Office of Correctional Education (OCE), CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://
www.cdcr.ca. gov/rehabilitation/oce.html.
54 LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:221(1) (2017).
55 LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 905.1(B) (2017).
56 Id. art. 905.1(B)(4).
57 Id. art. 905.1(E)–(F).
58 Id. art. 905.1(G).
59 See Christine D. Ely, Note, A Criminal Education: Arguing for Adequacy in Adult Correc-
tional Facilities, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 795, 800 (2008).
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reflect the fact that “education adequacy for young people incarcerated in
adult penal institutions is rarely litigated,” presumably due in part to the diffi-
culty of asserting equal protection claims and jumping hurdles set by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act in these cases.60  It is clear that, “[b]ecause juve-
nile offenders have a right to a public education, all programs for incarcer-
ated youth include a correctional education component.”61  Much less clear
is a juvenile’s right to educational programming when the state chooses to
characterize the youth as an “adult” during his or her trial and sentencing
hearing.62 The education and criminal codes of Pennsylvania, Michigan,
California, and Louisiana devote little (if any) attention to this incongruity.
Researchers posit that “[i]n most states, it is likely that policymakers and even
state agency leaders lack the full picture of what educational and vocational
services are available to incarcerated youth; who is responsible for the provi-
sion of these services; and what, if any, outcomes students are achieving.”63
Of course, state law primarily governs youth education, rather than the
Constitution or federal law.64  The federal government arguably has little
authority to enforce compulsory education laws in state prisons.  Notably,
where the federal government does have authority to regulate prison educa-
tion for youths, it has done so.  Almost two decades ago, the Department of
Justice assessed juvenile detention in adult prisons and clarified that
“[d]espite being placed in adult facilities, minors retain special civil rights to
education . . . that may require additional or special programs.  These rights
have consequences in staffing and access to appropriate programs that are
responsive to the developmental . . . needs that are unique to adolescents.”65
All juveniles with disabilities, for example, have a right to free appropriate
public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
60 Id. at 811–12.
61 LOIS M. DAVIS ET AL., RAND CORP., HOW EFFECTIVE IS CORRECTIONAL EDUCATION,
AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? THE RESULTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION iii
(2014); see also id. at 24 (“A fundamental difference between correctional education for
juvenile and adult populations is that juveniles in the United States have a right to a public
education. . . . [T]he question facing policymakers is not whether to provide education
services for juveniles in correctional facilities, but which types of programs are most
effective.”).
62 See, e.g., Caitlin Curley, Juveniles Tried as Adults: What Happens When Children Go to
Prison, GENFKD (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.genfkd.org/juveniles-tried-adults-happens-
children-go-prison (“There are . . . laws granting all juveniles the right to education, which
apply to youth in correctional facilities.  However, many . . . do not have access to any
education.  A 2005 survey of adult facilities found that 40 percent of the jails and prisons
had no educational services at all.”).
63 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., LOCKED OUT: IMPROVING EDUCATIONAL AND
VOCATIONAL OUTCOMES FOR INCARCERATED YOUTH 14 (2015)
64 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
65 JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND
JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 9 (Oct. 2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/
182503.pdf.
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Act, even in the adult prison context.66  Although, states may alter the con-
tours of this right for a “bona fide security or compelling penological interest
that cannot otherwise be accommodated.”67
In addition, the Obama administration’s Every Student Succeeds Act
(ESSA) replaced the No Child Left Behind Act in December 2015, purport-
ing to usher in a new era of bipartisan education reform.68  Although ESSA
contains no provision specifically addressing JLWOP, it does include guide-
lines intended to grant incarcerated juveniles the “opportunity to meet the
same challenging State academic standards that all children in the State are
expected to meet.”69  Particularly pertinent to this Note, the Act expressly
offers funding to those states “providing free public education for children
and youth . . . in adult correctional institutions.”70  Moreover, the Act “places
a greater emphasis on students in juvenile justice programs earning a tradi-
tional high school diploma,” rather than a GED.71  Practical challenges to
implementing federal reforms on both the state and municipal level are man-
ifold, however.  ESSA itself acknowledges that a “mish-mash of state and local
agencies are responsible for educating these [incarcerated] students”72 dur-
ing their time in adult prison.73  Prison reform advocates cite this type of
disorganization as a central flaw in correctional educational programming
initiatives nationwide.74
On a broader scale, public attitude toward prisoners and popular opin-
ion about the goals and purposes of incarceration have long influenced the
66 Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), 34 C.F.R. § 300.101 (2006).  Under
§ 300.102(a)(2), these rights do not extend to a prisoner with disabilities over the age of
eighteen whose disabilities were not identified during childhood and who did not have an
Individualized Education Plan prior to incarceration. See also Donnell C. v. Ill. State Bd. of
Educ., 829 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Green v. Johnson, 513 F. Supp. 965 (D.
Mass. 1981).  For an unorthodox argument addressing the lack of age-appropriate educa-
tional programming in prisons for incarcerated youth, see Patrick A. Keenan & Celeste M.
Hammond, The Institutionalized Child’s Claim to Special Education: A Federal Codification of the
Right to Treatment, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 337 (1979) (suggesting that incarcerated children
are entitled to all rights extended to special needs students because every incarcerated
child can be classified as a student with special needs).
67 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(d)(2)(i) (2017).
68 See Frederick M. Hess & Max C. Eden, States Plan for Sensible School Reform Under an
Obama-Era Law, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 21, 2017).
69 20 U.S.C. § 6421(a)(1) (2012).
70 Id. § 6431(3).  Notably, the Act requires that “in making services available to chil-
dren and youth in adult correctional institutions, priority will be given to such children
and youth who are likely to complete incarceration within a 2-year period.” Id.
§ 6434(c)(2).
71 Andrew Ujifusa, The Changes ESSA Makes for Educating Children in the Juvenile-Justice
System, EDUC. WK. (June 16, 2016), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/
2016/06/essa_juvenile_justice_ changes_education. html.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See id.; see also COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., supra note 63, at 2 (only nine
states designate one state or local agency to oversee educational programming for incarcer-
ated youth).
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availability and quality of correctional education for youths in adult prison.75
Educational programming in adult prisons is not a rare or new phenome-
non, nor do many Americans doubt its benefits.76  Attention to educational
programming in adult prisons has grown in recent years, due in part to the
increasing number of youths charged as adults nationwide.77  One recent
study suggests that youths incarcerated in adult prisons might often have bet-
ter access to education than their peers’ juvenile detention programs, in part
because youths’ proportional access to educational programming is much
greater in adult prisons where youths are a minority.78  Nevertheless, while
juvenile courts are expressly designed “to turn delinquents into productive
citizens through treatment,”79 adult prisons generally—often by necessity—
devote more attention to incapacitation and prison safety; education is a sec-
ondary priority.80  As a practical matter, state budgets also exert strong power
over the quantity and quality of educational programming when the priority
of such programming is relatively low.81
B. The Purpose: Preparing Students for Active Membership in Society
Elementary and secondary education in the United States serve innu-
merable purposes—likely as many as the number of legislators who formed
and continue to reform state education codes—that range from “preparing
75 See RICHARD J. COLEY & PAUL E. BARTON, EDUC. TESTING SERV., LOCKED UP AND
LOCKED OUT: AN EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE U.S. PRISON POPULATION 5 (2006),
https://www.ets.org/Media/Research/pdf/PIC-LOCKEDUP.pdf (“[W]hen the rehabilita-
tion approach to corrections has been in favor, prison education has prospered.”).
76 See Martin Forst et al., Youth in Prisons and Training Schools: Perceptions and Conse-
quences of the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy, 40 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 8 (1989).
77 Aaron Kupchik, The Correctional Experiences of Youth in Adult and Juvenile Prisons, 24
JUST. Q. 247, 247 (2007) (“[S]tates increasingly rely on adult jails and prisons to house
violent adolescent offenders.”); see also AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 1 (noting the
“increasing incidence and severity of juvenile crime” since the 1980s, and finding that “this
trend appears to have peaked in 1994”).
78 See Kupchik, supra note 77, at 266 (“[A] more even distribution of services in juve-
nile facilities might mean that each young adult actually receives relatively less education
and treatment.”).  Kupchik emphasizes that educational programming is required by the
adult prisons for “[a]ny inmate younger than 21 with no high school degree (or GED).”
Id. at 260.  But see Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27
CRIME & JUST. 81, 140 (2000) (“The teacher/inmate ratio in adult institutions is 1:100.  A
national survey of prison inmates in 1991 indicated that fewer than half received any aca-
demic instruction.”). Cf. supra note 41 and accompanying text.
79 COLEY & BARTON, supra note 75, at 11.
80 See, e.g., Kim Chandler, Budget Cuts Threaten Prison Reform Effort, WASH. TIMES (Sept.
7, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/7/budget-cuts-threaten-
prison-reform-effort/. But see VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, BUILDING EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIPS
FOR HIGH-QUALITY POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 1 (2016) (“Post-
secondary education in prison improves safety.  Facilities with college programs report
fewer conduct issues and less violence, making the prison safer for staff and incarcerated
people alike.”).
81 COLEY & BARTON, supra note 75, at 5.
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students to enter the international workforce[ ] to contribute to the global
community, economy, and marketplace”82 to “the advancement of knowl-
edge and the dissemination of truth.”83  Despite the wide range of purposes
underlying education law, federal courts have consistently offered a core,
daresay “national” perspective on the purpose of youth education in the
United States: education prepares young people to be successful members of
a thriving democracy.
Consider the following early perspectives on the goals of state-sponsored
education.  Even before the Founding, courts and public figures offered
robust, community-minded rationales for the project of public education:
As early as 1642, the Massachusetts General Court announced that chil-
dren were to be educated in order to “read and understand religion and the
laws of the [state].”  Horace Mann . . . rationalized that the reason to edu-
cate the masses was to ensure that citizens were “fit to be a voter.” . . . Benja-
min Franklin ascertained that the measure of successful education is what
one does with his or her skills and knowledge.84
Centuries later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court considered a
similar perspective on education held by Thomas Jefferson at the time of the
Founding: “education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effec-
tively and intelligently in our open political system . . . to be self-reliant and
self-sufficient participants in society.”85  The Court embraced Jefferson’s
words.86 Yoder pressed the Court to consider whether Wisconsin’s compul-
sory education law should yield to genuine religious objections by Old Order
Amish students and their parents.87  The Court did recognize a narrow
exception to Wisconsin’s law, but in so doing, firmly emphasized that “courts
are not school boards or legislatures, and are ill-equipped to determine the
‘necessity’ of discrete aspects of a State’s program of compulsory educa-
tion.”88  Despite the Court’s holding, Yoder affirms that state compulsory edu-
cation laws are nearly impossible to circumvent, and further, that such
matters should generally be left to the states.  A state’s interest in protecting
“democratic society [that] rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens” is presump-
tively too compelling for the court to disturb.89
82 Chelsea Lauren Chicosky, Comment, Restructuring the Modern Education System in the
United States: A Look at the Value of Compulsory Education Laws, 2015 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 8–9;
see also Derek Messacar & Philip Oreopoulos, Staying in School: A Proposal for Raising High-
School Graduation Rates, 29 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. (2013) (“Increasing high-school attainment
should be regarded as part of a more general goal to make youth more competitive in the
labor market. . . . [Education is similarly necessary to] drive today’s economy.”).
83 Senator John F. Kennedy, Remarks at Harvard University (June 14, 1956).
84 Chicosky, supra note 82, at 6–7 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
85 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 207–09.
88 Id. at 235.
89 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (No. 70-110), 1971 WL 126409, at
*8 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)).
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In 1987, the Sixth Circuit indicated that public education is an “‘assimi-
lative force’ that brings together ‘diverse and conflicting elements’ in our
society” by “teaching fundamental values ‘essential to a democratic soci-
ety.’”90  In a similar vein, the Supreme Court has stated that “access to ideas
. . . prepares students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic,
often contentious society in which they will soon be adult members. . . .
‘[S]tudents must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to
gain new maturity and understanding.’”91
Many individual state education codes also set forth states’ unique per-
spectives on the purposes of education, presumably for the purpose of guid-
ing courts’ interpretation of the codes.92  For instance, California’s
legislature contends that the purpose of education is “to enable each child to
develop all of his or her own potential,” and that public schools are “main-
tained for the benefit of the pupils, their parents, and the community at
large.”93  Although this goal is not facially community- or democracy-ori-
ented, the notion that California requires all youths under the age of eigh-
teen to participate in educational programming that “develop[s]” their
“potential” suggests that California believes, contrary to incorrigibility argu-
ments advanced by JLWOP proponents, that all youths within the scope of its
compulsory education laws have some potential to develop.94  Moreover, the
Code entrusts California to facilitate this development.
The legislatures of Pennsylvania, Michigan,95 and Louisiana did not
explicitly state the purposes of education in their state education codes; apart
from time-sensitive, often politically charged goals that develop alongside leg-
islation,96 the purposes of education in such states have arguably been articu-
lated best by the Supreme Court.
90 Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1068 (6th Cir. 1987) (first
quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979); then quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)).
91 Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868
(1982) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
92 LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCI-
PLES AND RECENT TRENDS 34 (2011) (“To apply the principle that statutory language be
interpreted consistent with congressional intent, courts may consult the stated purposes of
legislation to resolve ambiguities in the more specific language of operative sections.”).
93 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 33080 (West 2017); ROMUALDO P. ECLAVEA ET AL., 56 CAL. JUR.
3D SCHOOLS § 2 (“Purposes of Public Schools”).
94 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 33080.
95 Michigan’s constitution does provide, in establishing the right to education, that
“knowledge [is] necessary to good government.” MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (West 2017).
This language derives directly from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which attempted to
establish on a regional level for inhabitants of the western territories that “education is
necessary to become a good citizen.”  Kevin VanZant, The Land Ordinance of 1785 and North-
west Ordinance of 1787, HISTORY OF AM. EDUC. WEB PROJECT (last updated June 15, 2004).
96 See, e.g., Press Release, Mich. State Bd. of Educ. & Superintendent, State Board
Adopts Strategic Goals to Make Michigan a Top 10 Education State in 10 Years (Dec. 8,
2015), http://www.michigan.gov/mde/0,4615,7-140-5373_5379-370853—,00.html (fram-
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C. The Tension: JLWOP Precludes Students’ Active Membership in Society
Tragically, “juveniles housed in adult prisons are 36 times more likely to
commit suicide than juveniles housed apart from adult offenders.”97  This
alone suggests that states shortchange their most delinquent youths.  The
same futures in which tax dollars, policy initiatives, and local educators invest
are systematically, albeit indirectly, derailed by a criminal process98 that con-
tradicts the very principles upon which state education laws rest.  Although
adult prisons do not literally take the lives of most JLWOP prisoners,99 pris-
ons do strip their inmates of rights considered fundamental to membership
in a democratic society.  Rather than suffering physical death, young homi-
cide defendants face “civil death” when the state commits them to life with-
out parole for crimes of “irreparable corruption.”100
“Civil death” has been defined as “the loss of rights—such as the rights
to vote and hold public office—by a person serving a life sentence or await-
ing execution.”101  In all but two states, felons convicted of crimes of moral
turpitude lose the right to vote in local, state, and federal elections while
incarcerated.102  The right to vote is essential to membership in democratic
society; without eligibility to exert one’s own share of control over the politi-
cal process, prisoners lose political voice.  Most felons regain voting rights
ing education reform as a tool to raise household incomes and ensure economic security
in Michigan).
97 Jessica Lahey, The Steep Costs of Keeping Juveniles in Adult Prisons, ATLANTIC (Jan. 8,
2016).
98 States reserve the right to try juveniles as adults for crimes of homicide and serious
sex offenses. ANNE TEIGEN, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, JUVENILE AGE OF
JURISDICTION AND TRANSFER TO ADULT COURT LAWS (2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
civil-and-criminal-justice/juvenile-age-of-jurisdiction-and-transfer-to-adult-court-laws.aspx
(“[A]ll states have transfer laws that allow or require young offenders to be prosecuted as
adults for more serious offenses, regardless of their age.”); COLEY & BARTON, supra note 75,
at 11 (“Through the 1950s, most juvenile courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over all
those under age 18 . . . .”).
99 But see William W. Berry III, Life-With-Hope Sentencing: The Argument for Replacing Life-
Without-Parole Sentences with Presumptive Life Sentences, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1054 (2015)
(“For some, an LWOP sentence is worse than a death sentence, as death sentences at least
mark an anticipated end to suffering.”).  For a scholarly challenge to this observation, see
Michael M. O’Hear, The Beginning of the End for Life Without Parole?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 6
(2010) (finding that prison inmates’ “positive feelings increase and negative feelings
decrease steadily over a period of years”).
100 See O’Hear, supra note 99, at 5 (“If you intentionally take the life of another person,
then the state takes your life away—not literally, of course, but . . . a sort of civil death.
Viewed this way, there is an appealing symmetry between LWOP and the underlying
offense.”).
101 Death, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
102 In Maine and Vermont, convicted felons never lose the right to vote. NAT’L CONFER-
ENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FELON VOTING RIGHTS (2016), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx; see also CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET
AL., 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016,
at 4 (2016).
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after completing their sentences and fulfilling additional state-specific
requirements, such as asking pardon from the state or refraining from crimi-
nal conduct for an additional period of time after their release.103  JLWOP
recipients, who enter prison before ever gaining the right to vote, have been
permanently stripped of the chance to acquire, let alone exercise, their polit-
ical voice.  Notwithstanding the political controversy surrounding disen-
franchisement,104 it is indisputable that this restriction limits prisoners’
ability to “participate effectively and intelligently in our open political sys-
tem,”105 one of the primary purposes for which youths are educated.  Other
rights associated with membership in democratic society denied to JLWOP
recipients include the right to hold political office and all First Amendment
rights deemed “inconsistent with . . . status as an inmate.”106
In addition to the concrete deprivation of rights associated with active
membership in democratic society, it is worth noting that “LWOP sends a
[strong] message of permanent exclusion from . . . the ordinary community of
fellow citizenship.”107  Although a youth who enters state prison with a
JLWOP sentence never technically loses status as a “social being,” (he or she
arguably retains the opportunity to become a productive member of the
prison community), this qualified productivity and limited sphere of commu-
nity must not be what states have in mind when they prepare each young
citizen for the “pluralistic, often contentious society in which they will soon
be adult members.”108
D. The Result: Compulsory Education Laws and JLWOP Sentences
Cannot Coexist
Together, these premises lead to a single conclusion: JLWOP sentences
are incompatible with compulsory education laws.  If state law compels all
children to receive an education, and if a primary purpose of education is to
prepare students for active membership in democratic society, it is senseless
to permanently sentence children to life in prison, preventing them from
fulfilling the (often) stated purpose of their education.  By the same token, if
states enforce compulsory education laws to ensure that each child develops
103 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 102.
104 Compare Mandeep K. Dhami, Prisoner Disenfranchisement Policy: A Threat to Democracy?,
5 ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 235, 235 (2005) (arguing that disenfranchisement
is “counter to democratic ideals,” and that prisoners’ enfranchisement would greatly
impact the U.S. political climate, particularly with respect to local elections), with George
Brooks, Felon Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, and Politics, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851,
896 (2005) (“Locke’s social contract theory has withstood the test of time; it served as a
rationale for the enactment of felon disenfranchisement laws in the past, and remains a
compelling argument today.  When someone commits a crime, he commits it not just
against the victim, but against our entire society.” (footnote omitted)).
105 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
106 60 AM. JUR. 2D Penal & Corr. Etc. § 26 (West 2017).
107 O’Hear, supra note 99, at 6.
108 See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868
(1982) (plurality opinion).
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his or her potential to participate actively in community life and democratic
society, it is senseless for those states to educate a child after permanently
depriving him or her of a life beyond prison walls.
II. RESISTANCE
Several objections to the foregoing argument remain to be addressed.
First, JLWOP proponents will likely challenge the premise that life-with-
out-parole sentences completely deprive prisoners of the opportunity to ful-
fill the goals and purposes of their education.  One might argue that it is
unfair—even false—to suggest that JLWOP prisoners lose the opportunity to
become productive members of their communities or democratic society.
Youths do not lose their humanity or U.S. citizenship while incarcerated.
Prison does not prohibit youths from continuing to develop on an intellec-
tual, emotional, or spiritual level; the educational programming offered by
most adult prisons helps to facilitate this development.109  Indeed, “[l]ife
goes on for LWOP inmates.”110  Such challengers might point to evidence
that even JLWOP recipients find creative ways to contribute to their commu-
nities behind bars.  Groups like KID C.A.T. (“Creating Awareness
Together”), for example, established by JLWOP prisoners confined in Cali-
fornia’s San Quentin State Prison, “conduct[ ] food and hygiene product
drives for the homeless, fundrais[e] to sponsor youth involvement in commu-
nity programs, rais[e] awareness and money for cancer research, and fol[d]
hundreds of origami hearts for kids at Oakland’s Children’s Hospital.”111
Moreover, although JLWOP does prevent youths from participating in the
democratic process in traditional ways, prisoners may assume an active role in
the political process by aiding the development of civil rights law from within
their prison cells.  Prisoners, who remain fully entitled to file actions under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens while incarcerated, may use these judicial chan-
nels to vindicate their own constitutional rights.  In so doing, JLWOP recipi-
ents might exert an influence over judicial interpretation of those rights or
the construction of federal laws like § 1983.112
Fortunately, this objection has significant merit.  States do not deprive
JLWOP recipients of the right to membership in their prison communities or
family units; nor does incarceration alter a JLWOP recipient’s citizenship sta-
tus.  JLWOP indeed provides leeway for inmates, imprisoned as youths, to
109 See generally KATHERINE A. CARLSON & MICHELLE M. MAIKE, EDUCATING JUVENILES IN
ADULT JAILS: A PROGRAM GUIDE (2010), http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/Edu
cating-Juveniles-in-Adult-Jails-Washington-Program-Guide-7.10.pdf.
110 O’Hear, supra note 99, at 5 (“They adapt to prison.  They are able to acquire privi-
leges through good behavior . . . [and] enjoy recreational opportunities, a social life, and
family visits . . . [and] receive food, shelter, and medical care at state expense.”).
111 Xavier McElrath-Bey, Redeemed Juveniles Like Me Are Not the Exception, JUV. JUST. INFO.
EXCHANGE (Oct. 13, 2016), http://jjie.org/2016/10/13/redeemed-juveniles-like-me-are-
not-the-exception/.
112 See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327 (1986); see generally Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
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lead meaningful and purposeful lives.  JLWOP does, however, deprive youths
of the ability to achieve full social and political potential, as contemplated by
education law.  JLWOP patently denies youths of “free[dom] to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding”;113 in fact,
JLWOP is inseverable from a presumption of incorrigibility.  It is impossible
to reconcile the incorrigibility presumption with the Court’s observation that
students, by their very nature, are capable of and deserving of the opportu-
nity to mature and grow.  Limited, relatively rare opportunities for commu-
nity membership and democratic activity within prison walls are insufficient
compensation for depriving students of the freedom to grow, both as intellec-
tual creatures and maturing citizens.
Second, a dissenter might object that the argument presented in this
Note is moot once a juvenile homicide defendant reaches seventeen or eigh-
teen years of age, depending on the state of incarceration’s compulsory edu-
cation age requirement.  If, after two years or less (perhaps just months or
weeks), the state no longer mandates education under compulsory education
law, the incompatibility between JLWOP and compulsory education seems
inconsequential.
This objection fails to consider the gravity of the incompatibility between
JLWOP and compulsory education laws.  Until a minor inmate reaches the
age cap set within a state’s compulsory education statute, the state’s educa-
tion code deems that student capable of development.  Until the state ceases
its education mandate with respect to the inmate, the state’s purported goal
is to prepare that inmate for active participation in society.  State education
law and JLWOP are no less incompatible when the inmate is seventeen than
when the inmate is ten years old.  Eliminating youths’ chance to fulfill the
purpose of the education required of them by law is no less offensive over a
span of five weeks than of five years.
Third, wary readers might argue that the difficulty of resentencing hun-
dreds of youths currently serving JLWOP sentences114 will dissuade states
from eliminating JLWOP on the grounds of a novel, nonconstitutional, state-
law inconsistency argument.  These readers might point to evidence that
states such as Pennsylvania already struggle to comply with Montgomery, which
did not go so far as forbidding JLWOP, by resentencing those who received
mandatory JLWOP sentences before Miller.115
113 Pico, 457 U.S. at 868 (plurality opinion) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114 See supra Section I.C.
115 See generally Jonas Fortune, Officials Seek Guidance from State Supreme Court Before Resen-
tencing Lancaster County Juvenile Lifers, LANCASTER ONLINE (Nov. 19, 2016), http://lancaster-
online.com/news/local/officials-seek-guidance-from-state-supreme-court-before-resenten
cing-lancaster/article_3f6b424e-add4-11e6-9ff8-f3d5498ab4aa.html.  Granted, this form of
“participation” in the democratic process is several times removed from the JLWOP recipi-
ent’s own power to act.  First, another actor must violate the JLWOP recipient’s rights, such
that the JLWOP recipient can state a plausible claim for relief.  Second, the JLWOP recipi-
ent’s case will only bear significant influence on the court’s construction of law, as stated in
the proposed objection, if the JLWOP recipient’s case happens to raise a novel issue of
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The simple, though not entirely satisfying, response to this concern must
implicate Montgomery itself.  The practical difficulty of resentencing JLWOP
recipients under mandatory sentencing guidelines did not stop the Supreme
Court from issuing its holding in Montgomery, requiring states to apply Miller
retroactively.116  And practically speaking, the number of prisoners currently
serving JLWOP sentences is limited geographically (and proportionally, with
respect to any given prison population).  Once states such as Pennsylvania,
Michigan, and Louisiana establish clearer resentencing guidelines, which
they must in order to comply with Montgomery, the burden of conducting
resentencing hearings will be far outweighed by the benefit to those sen-
tenced and the achievement of congruence in state law.
Finally, even the most sympathetic critic might attack the foregoing
argument on the following grounds.  Standing alone, the conclusion that
compulsory education and JLWOP are incompatible is not much of a conclu-
sion at all.  If a state legislature accepts the above premises, either JLWOP or
JLWOP recipients’ right to education must be contrary to the goals and pur-
poses of state-sponsored education.  States could just as easily, perhaps even
more easily, amend compulsory education laws to explicitly remove JLWOP
recipients from the umbrella of their protection, as they could amend crimi-
nal codes to eliminate JLWOP from sentencing guidelines.117  States would
not only save tax dollars, but also dodge logistical hurdles associated with
providing sufficient educational programing to youths in adult prisons.118
An additional gloss on the argument is thus necessary to move from the soft
conclusion of “incompatibility” to the firm conclusion that JLWOP, rather
than undiscriminating, mandatory youth education, must lose the fight.
Even if it is simpler, for the sake of argument, to amend a state’s educa-
tion code than to eliminate JLWOP from the state’s criminal code, it is diffi-
cult to ignore the congruence between principles underlying state
compulsory education laws and the Supreme Court’s snowballing commen-
interpretation.  Equating this scenario with “active” participation in democratic society is
thus a stretch.
116 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736–37 (2016); see also supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
117 For a complementary argument that states can, and should, reduce the age of com-
pulsory education for all children, see Chicosky, supra note 82, at 52 (“[For] future genera-
tions to be independent, productive members of society . . . states should consider
strengthening vocational-technical (CTE) education, and abolishing compulsory educa-
tion laws for the types of education we currently mandate at the middle and high school
levels.”). But see Messacar & Oreopoulos, supra note 82 (arguing that a “key element” in
improving high school graduation rates and closing the achievement gap “is for all states to
increase their minimum school-leaving age to 18”).
118 See RUTH DELANEY ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, MAKING THE GRADE: DEVELOPING
QUALITY POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN PRISON 13–14, 21 (2016) (noting obsta-
cles such as adversarial partnerships between educational institutions and prisons, uncoop-
erative corrections staff, “insufficient financial resources, lack of suitable facilities, and
limited staff capacity to purchase, implement, and maintain equipment and software, and
monitor advances in technologies”).
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tary on juvenile malleability and minors’ potential for development.119
Behind every state law requiring children to attend school until age seven-
teen or eighteen is a logical implication that state legislatures believe all chil-
dren are presumptively teachable.  Not only are children in school presumed
capable of processing academic information; they are also presumed capable
of “gaining a sense of responsibility and reliability” throughout their elemen-
tary- and secondary-school tenures.120  This implication is remarkably com-
patible with reasoning used by the Supreme Court to establish categorical
rules under the Eighth Amendment in the context of juvenile punishment.
Recall that these cases “rested not only on common sense—on what ‘any par-
ent knows’—but on science and social science as well.”121
The Court has embraced several blanket characterizations of youths
throughout this body of caselaw, including a presumption that juvenile
defendants have an “underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”122  State com-
pulsory education laws make the same presumption.  On these grounds, it
seems only natural for states to permit incarcerated youths to reap the full
benefits of their education, allowing them to reenter society and regain
rights essential to democracy.  Only in this way may incarcerated youths fulfill
a primary purpose of their legally mandated education.
Furthermore, to accompany the argument that JLWOP would be more
difficult to eliminate from state codes than education for JLWOP prisoners, a
challenger might draw attention to the Court’s decades-old finding that
“however strong the State’s interest in universal compulsory education, it is
by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other inter-
ests.”123  It is indeed arguable that public safety interests, such as the need to
incapacitate murderers, trump the state’s interest in extending public educa-
tion to youth prisoners.
However, a state’s right to require all children to receive an education,
and children’s reciprocal rights to receive public education from the state,124
may not easily be curtailed.  Even before the Court held in Yoder that Wiscon-
sin could not require Old Order Amish teens to attend school after reaching
the age of sixteen, it required the Amish to meet the “difficult burden of
demonstrating the adequacy of their alternative mode of continuing infor-
119 See supra Section I.A.
120 Susan B. Bastable & Michelle A. Dart, Developmental Stages of the Learner, in HEALTH
PROFESSIONAL AS EDUCATOR: PRINCIPLES OF TEACHING AND LEARNING 151, 158–73 (Susan B.
Bastable et al. eds., 2011).
121 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569 (2005)).
122 Id. at 2458 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 165 (1944)) (weighing the state’s interest in compulsory education against peti-
tioners’ right to free exercise under the First Amendment).
124 “Nearly every state constitution requires the state to provide its children with an
education,” with the exception of Mississippi, the state that “causes counting confusion.”
Josh Kagan, Note, A Civics Action: Interpreting “Adequacy” in State Constitutions’ Education
Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2241 & n.1 (2003).
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mal vocational education.”125  One “must move with great circumspec-
tion”126 to establish an interest compelling enough to override the state’s
interest in requiring education for each of its citizens.  Here, if a state court
happened to accept the argument that JLWOP and compulsory education
laws are legally incompatible, it would likely find that JLWOP loses the fight
against the state’s right to require education.  After all, the state may turn to
a wide range of alternative incapacitation, punishment, deterrence, and retri-
bution mechanisms available to protect the public from would-be JLWOP
recipients.127
CONCLUSION
In sum, education law could be a new, powerful tool for youth advocates
to wield in their attempts to eliminate JLWOP nationwide.  Even beyond the
four corners of the battle against JLWOP, the premises set forth in this Note
should inform discussions about the purposes of education in the context of
youth imprisonment, as well as youths’ right to education in adult prisons,
which has been less than clearly defined by courts and scholars.  Although it
might be possible to advance other prisoners’ rights claims within the frame-
work of the argument presented—such as a claim that all youth incarceration
in adult prisons is unlawful if those prisons are unable to establish adequate
educational programming, or a claim that adults reaping the benefits of edu-
cational programming within prison must have the same opportunity to reen-
ter their communities and regain democratic rights as JLWOP recipients—
those arguments are beyond the scope of this Note.  Ideally, youth advocates
and prison education reformers alike will continue to build on the founda-
tions laid here, incorporating the purposes of education into discussions of
school and prison program reform, and enabling state education laws to do
what they do best: empower our nation’s youth.
125 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.
126 Id.; see Ralph D. Mawdsley, Religion in Public Schools, in KEY LEGAL ISSUES FOR
SCHOOLS: THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE FOR SCHOOL BUSINESS OFFICIALS 177, 178 (Charles J.
Russo ed., 2d ed. 2013) (“[C]ourts generally limited Yoder to only Amish educational set-
tings, thereby upholding state regulations under a reasonableness test.”).
127 The court might look to incapacitation mechanisms used by the eighteen states in
which JLWOP is unlawful; it might also consider recent reforms to JLWOP sentencing
regimes enacted by states such as California. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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